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What do Snowmobiles, Mercury Emissions,
Greenhouse Gases and Runoff
Have in Common?:
The Controversy over “Junk Science”
Professor Linda A. Malone*
This week, the State Board of Education in Kansas is continuing its
hearings on how evolution should be taught in public schools. In other
news, besides the evolution debate in Kansas, eight players from the
Chicago White Sox were accused of throwing the World Series, flappers everywhere are getting their knickers off by sitting on flagpoles,
and the stock market crashed. And that’s this week’s installment of
“Things I Thought Already Happened in the 1920’s.”1

In a world in which less and less seems certain and stable,
science has been viewed as an objective measure of certainty, reassuring in its impartiality and precision. The bedrock assurance of that legitimacy, however, has been now called into question. The determinations of legitimate scientists are maligned
with personal attacks and assertions of an underlying political
agenda. These attacks are facilitated by revelations that scientists are not immune to the pressures of celebrity status and
funding demands, even to the point of falsifying results. Nonscientists are called upon to review and revise scientific evaluations. Positions with little or no underlying scientific consensus
are trumpeted as the “scientific” basis for politically-driven positions. The very question of what constitutes “science” has become an issue for school boards and the courts.
Has science become so politicized that regulation is dictated
by desired political outcomes and not legally mandated considerations of public health and safety? Changes in regulatory poli∗
Marshall-Wythe Foundation Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights and
National Security Law Program, William and Mary Law School. B.A., Vassar College;
J.D., Duke University Law School; LL.M., University of Illinois College of Law. Professor
Malone is the author of Chapter 4, Ocean and Coastal Pollution from Land-Based Sources
in Appendix 6 the U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AND OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE
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1 Dennis Miller, 2005: Laugh Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, § 4, at 2.
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cies and requirements between administrations are not unusual,
but ordinarily these changes are differences in degree of regulation based on scientific variances within a generally accepted
range of scientific conclusions. Recently, however, regulatory reversals have been just that: complete reversals based on scientific
determinations that flatly contradict conclusions reached only a
few years, or even months, earlier within the same agency. For
example, as discussed below, one federal judge, frustrated with
the yo-yoing federal policy on snowmobiles in Yellowstone National Park, chided the agency for claiming a change in scientific
basis without justification.2 Environmental advocates are challenging the EPA’s relaxed position on controlling mercury air
emissions for totally ignoring a Harvard study on point released
just weeks after the EPA’s change in regulatory approach, and
provided in draft form to the agency precisely for its consideration in relation to the mercury standards.3 The New York Times
broke a story that a non-scientist in the Bush administration
made critical revisions to an EPA document on global warming,
minimizing the impacts and significance of increases in global
temperatures.4 The problem of controlling nonpoint source pollution has not escaped some of these troublesome developments, as
the thirty-year lack of mandatory controls is premised on the
“infeasibility” of imposing those controls on the primary source of
pollution preventing nationwide attainment of water quality
standards.5
When is science “junk science” and simply a pretext for a
predetermined political agenda? How and when can courts reject
“science” offered by agencies to justify their decisions, or for that
matter, by school boards to revise their scientific curriculum?
How can “junk science” be detected, when the very determination
of what constitutes “science” is being questioned? What does this
controversy over science portend for the future of controlling
nonpoint source pollution?
I. THE GENESIS OF THE CONTROVERSY
The Bush Administration’s specific policies in the scientific
realm, though unaccepted by many, are not as controversial as
the allegations of a deliberate, systematic misuse of science to
serve a political agenda. “Junk science” is generally recognized
as the use of purported scientific research, not conducted by sci2 See discussion infra Part II. A CAUTIONARY TALE OF SNOWMOBILES, MERCURY
EMISSIONS, AND GREENHOUSE GASES.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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entific persons or substantiated by generally accepted scientific
methodologies, for political purposes; suppressing legitimate
studies; changing data in scientific studies without scientific justifications; and in extreme cases, discrediting scientists who do
not tote the party line.
When psychologist William R. Miller was interviewed for a
position in the National Drug Abuse Advisory Panel, he was
asked whether he voted for Bush.6 Miller replied in the negative
and he was later denied the appointment.7 The White House, of
course, claims there were other reasons for the denial.8 In another case, EPA ombudsman Robert Martin resigned after his investigation of the air quality following the attacks on 9/11 revealed startling health concerns that the EPA and the
administration had ignored. 9 Before Martin resigned, the ombudsman’s office was closed and padlocked and all of Martin’s
files were confiscated.10
In February 2004, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued
a report criticizing the Bush administration’s use of science for a
political agenda.11 The report asserted that the administration’s
political agenda had undermined “the traditionally objective,
nonpartisan mechanisms through which the government uses
scientific knowledge in forming and implementing public policy.”12 A petition accompanied the report and was signed by more
than sixty prominent scientists, including twenty Nobel laureates.13 The petition as of February 2006 had gathered more than
8,000 signatures.14 In 2004, Scientists and Engineers for Change
organized lectures aimed at showing the scientific community’s
opposition to Bush’s candidacy for a second term.15 In June 2004,
the ACLU released a report entitled “Science under Siege” exploring the restrictions put on access to equipment and free
movement of foreign scientists.16
In June 2005, Senator Richard Durbin introduced the Restore Scientific Integrity in Federal Research and Policymaking
CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 237–38 (2005).
Id.
Id. at 238.
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, CRIMES AGAINST NATURE: HOW GEORGE W. BUSH AND HIS
CORPORATE PALS ARE PLUNDERING THE COUNTRY AND HIJACKING OUR DEMOCRACY 79–80
(2005).
10 Id.
11 Daniel Smith, Political Science, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 38.
12 Id. (internal citation omitted).
13 Id.
14 Karen Tumulty & Mark Thompson, The Political Science Test, TIME, Feb. 13,
2006, at 37.
15 Smith, supra note 11.
16 Id. at 39.
6
7
8
9
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bill.17 The bill aims to stop government censorship and alteration
of scientific data, and has garnered such co-sponsors as Senator
Hillary Rodham Clinton and Senator Harry Reid.18 However,
since the introduction of the bill, no further action has been
taken toward its approval. Despite the minimal likelihood of the
bill being passed, its proposal indicates how strong the perception has become that the Bush administration is “anti-science.”
No one addressing the current controversy is so naive as to assume that manipulation of scientific data has never been done to
serve a political purpose—it is more the extent (or correctly or incorrectly the general perception of the extent) to which it is occurring in the current administration. To some extent, this perception may be largely the result of two areas, global warming
and stem-cell research, in which a strong consensus in the scientific community has been largely rejected as unconvincing by the
administration.
Personal attacks on scientists or educators for their views on
either end of the political spectrum, of course, are never an acceptable or legitimate method of policymaking and public discourse. Such attacks do regrettably occur, and neo-conservative
advocates are no less immune than liberal advocates. In a November 10, 2005 story on National Public Radio, science professors who accept the validity of intelligent design as a scientific
theory expressed their own concerns about suffering retaliation
from their scientific colleagues and institutions.19 Dr. Richard
Sternberg described how colleagues at the Smithsonian accused
him of fraud and otherwise sought to discredit him personally
when he merely published in a Smithsonian peer-reviewed, scientific journal an article by Stephen Meyer, a proponent of intelligent design (a theory Sternberg himself does not share).20 Personal attacks and retaliation, however, are not at the core of the
controversy or the focus of this article. Rather, the question is
whether the somewhat sacred, public reverence for the impartiality of science and its determinations can no longer be maintained, because science itself has become so extensively and routinely politicized that objectivity can no longer be assumed.
These questions concerning the politics of science could not come
at a worse time for science itself, as it coincides with the highly
publicized incident of a South Korean scientist not merely massaging the results of his cloning work, but engaging in outright
Id. at 38.
Id.
All Things Considered: Profile: Intelligent design and academic freedom (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 10, 2005).
20 Id.
17
18
19
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falsification of his research results.21
The question remains whether the purported politicization of
science is something new, or just, to co-opt the old saying, “politics (and science) as usual.” In Chris Mooney’s book, The Republican War on Science,22 the answer is that there is indeed something different happening to the role of science and scientists in
policymaking and regulation. The author takes great pains in
his acknowledgments to point out that he is not a scientist, but a
journalist with a background for reporting on science, who prides
himself on evaluating “where scientists think the weight of evidence lies, without presuming to critically evaluate the science. . . .”23 In his epilogue, he warns that science politicization
succeeds because it confuses policymakers and the public with
thinking that a scientific “controversy” exists where it does not,
or that widely discredited scientific claims have more credence in
the scientific community than they do.24 According to Mooney,
what makes this situation different and, thus, more alarming is a
deliberate, conservative disregard for legitimate, peer-reviewed
and replicated science in favor of ideologically motivated “pseudoscience” (although he still acknowledges that “science abuse” is
not exclusively limited to conservative agendas). In particular,
he notes that the journalistic obsession with balance lends itself
to such pseudoscience, by giving credibility to any counter position rather than appear one-sided.25 Demarcation between good
and junk science may in most circumstances not be as difficult as
it first appears, when it is apparent that money or religion, for
example, are a stronger motivation for a position than any remotely scientific determinations.
II. A CAUTIONARY TALE OF SNOWMOBILES, MERCURY EMISSIONS,
AND GREENHOUSE GASES
It is certainly not unusual for different administrations to
differ as to the degree of environmental controls necessary to
regulate a pollutant, and for an intervening change in
administration therefore to result in a change in regulation.
Between the Clinton and Bush administrations, however, there
have been several high-profile regulatory reversals in which the
very need for regulation or the fundamental method of regulation
21 Lawrence K. Altman & William J. Broad, Global Trend: More Science, More
Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at F1; see also Nicholas Wade & Choe Sang-Hun, Human Cloning Was All Faked, Koreans Report, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at A1.
22 MOONEY, supra note 6.
23 Id. at vii.
24 Id. at 252.
25 Id. at 252–54.
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have been subject to reversal.
The very first of these reversals took place in the heated
controversy over snowmobiles in Yellowstone National Park.
A.

The Snowmobile Flip-Flop

Use of snowmobiles has been permitted in Yellowstone
National Park since 1963.26 In 2001, the Clinton administration
proposed a rule that would phase-out use of snowmobiles in
Yellowstone.27 By 1968, the use of snowmobiles had increased to
a level that mandated the Park Service to impose a “winter-only”
policy on their use.28 Since 1971, the Park Service has been
grooming trails to improve safety for the burgeoning number of
snowmobiles reflective of the growth in number of winter visitors
to Yellowstone to 140,000 by 1993.29
An environmental impact statement prepared in 2001 as
part of a settlement between environmental advocates and the
Park Service concluded that snowmbiles created problems of poor
air quality,30 disruption of wildlife feeding patterns,31 and noise
elevation.32 Based on the environmental impact statement’s
(EIS) conclusions, the Park Service proposed a regulation
adopting the EIS’s environmentally preferred alternative calling
for a complete phase-out of snowmobile use within two seasons in
favor of multipassenger snowcoach use.33 The regulation became
final the day after George W. Bush assumed office, but was
immediately
stayed
pending
review
by
the
Bush
Inevitably, the International Snowmobile
administration.34
Manufacturers Association filed suit to challenge the 2001 EIS

26 Jason Rapp, Snowmobiling and National Park Management: To Conserve for Future Generations or Provide for Public Enjoyment?, 17 TUL. ENVTL L.J. 301, 305 (2004).
27 Id. at 317.
28 Joanna M. Hooper, Blowing Snow: The National Park Service’s Disregard for Science, Law, and Public Opinion in Regulating Snowmobiling in Yellowstone National Park,
34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10975 (2004).
29 Rapp, supra note 26, at 305; see also Hooper, supra note 28, at 10975. Today, in
Yellowstone, there are over 180 miles of groomed trails and on days of high use, as many
as 1,700 snowmobiles enter the park. Id.
30 Snowmobiles produce 68% of the park’s annual carbon monoxide and 90% of the
park’s annual hydrocarbon emissions. Carbon monoxide levels in some areas of the park
are higher than the levels in Los Angeles and in 2002, the Park service actually issued
workers in high snowmobile areas their own respirators. Hooper, supra note 28, at 10975.
31 This has specifically affected four species that are protected by the Endangered
Species Act and live in Yellowstone: grizzly bears, gray wolves, bald eagles, and lynxes.
Id. at 10976.
32 The level of noise from snowmobiles has grown so loud that during the 2003–2004
winter season park employees were fitted with special devices to protect against hearing
loss. Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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regulation.35 As part of this settlement, the Park Service agreed
to prepare a supplemental EIS “consider[ing] data on new
snowmobile technologies.” 36
The supplemental 2003 EIS did not find any of the 2001 EIS
to be erroneous and even noted that the so-called new
snowmobile technology it said it would consider had in fact been
evaluated when the Park Service had prepared the 2001 EIS.37
Nevertheless, despite no apparent changes in the findings or
conclusions between the 2001 and 2003 EISs, the Park Service
decided to adopt a regulation “which provided for increased
numbers of snowmobiles, while imposing best available
technology (BAT) standards designed to reduce harmful
emissions, and requiring that 80% of entering snowmobiles be
accompanied by guides.”38
Within five days of the finalization of the 2003 rule allowing
snowmobiles, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan of the D.C. District
Court vacated the regulation and reinstated the 2001
regulation.39 Judge Sullivan did not simply hold that the
regulatory reversal regarding the use of snowmobiles in
Yellowstone was arbitrary and capricious. He reprimanded the
Park Service, finding that there was no evidence in the record of
a reasoned explanation for the reversal and that the
supplemental environmental impact statement was “completely
politically driven and result[-]oriented.”40 The judge denied
motions to stay his order reinstating the 2001 rule and, in
response to claims that such immediate reinstatement of the
2001 rule “would cause irreparable economic and emotional harm
to the local Yellowstone communities relying on snowmobile
business and to snowmobilers with already established vacation
plans,”41 the judge implied that the Park Service had deliberately
waited to publish the 2003 rule until the winter season at
Yellowstone opened, and “that ‘any economic or emotional harm
to snowmobilers with vacation plans falls squarely on the [Park
Service’s] shoulders.’”42
Discontent with the judgment of the distant D.C. District
Court, the state of Wyoming asked Judge Clarence Brimmer, of
the Wyoming Federal District Court, to reopen the case that
originally resulted in the writing of the supplemental EIS,
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Wyo. 2004).
Hooper, supra note 28, at 10977.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2003).
Hooper, supra note 28, at 10978; Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 108 n.11.
Hooper, supra note 28, at 10978.
Id. (citing Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 116).
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International Snowmobile Manufacturers Association v. Norton.43
Judge Brimmer enjoined enforcement of the 2001 rule which
Judge Sullivan had reinstated, holding that the harm of the 2001
rule to industry and the economy outweighed the harm of the
On February 11, 2004,
2003 rule to the environment.44
confronted with conflicting district court rulings despite no
change in the underlying factual record, the Park Service put in
place temporary snowmobile usage rules that permitted 798
snowmobiles in the park each day and, of the 798, required that
297 of them make use of the BAT standards to reduce noise and
pollution.45 The temporary rules also required that all snowmobilers be accompanied by a guide.46
The battle over snowmobiles continues, with the Bush administration calling for Congressional intervention and additional studies.47 In June 2004, the House of Representatives
voted 224 to 198 to allow snowmobiles into Yellowstone,48 and in
August of that same year, the Park Service proposed temporary
rules for snowmobile use in Yellowstone, which cap the number
of snowmobiles permitted in the park each day at 720.49 In addition to requiring that snowmobilers must be accompanied by a
guide, all snowmobiles must make use of the BAT standards to
reduce noise and pollution.50 These temporary rules will remain
in place for three years, at which time permanent rules will be
put in place.51 The Department of the Interior is considering a
modification of the requirement that all snowmobilers be with a
guide,52 despite the fact that that requirement was a part of both
the 2001 Rule and the 2003 Rule.
Negotiations over permanent rules have resulted in public
disagreements between the National Park Service and the Bush
administration. In August 2005, senior employees of the National Park Service rejected policy revisions affecting the use of
snowmobiles in Yellowstone.53 The revisions were proposed by
Paul Hoffman, of the Interior Department, and would have,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Snowmobile Deceit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005.
Juliet Eilperin, House Votes to Allow Snowmobiles in Parks; Bush Administration
Hails Decision, WASH. POST, June 18, 2004 at A27.
49 Michael Janofsky, U.S. would allow 720 Snowmobiles Daily at Yellowstone, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004 at A14 [hereinafter 720 Snowmobiles].
50 Felicity Barringer, Secretary Tours Yellowstone on Snowmobile, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2005, at A18 [hereinafter Secretary Tours Yellowstone on Snowmobile].
51 720 Snowmobiles, supra note 49.
52 Secretary Tours Yellowstone on Snowmobile, supra note 50.
53 See Felicity Barringer, Top Official Urged Change in How Parks Are Managed,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005 at A10.
43
44
45
46
47
48
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among other things, further eased the regulations regarding
snowmobile usage in Yellowstone and other national parks.54
Rather than approve these revisions, the Park Service employees
decided to draft a less permissible version of the changes proposed.55 Meanwhile, the snowmobiles have ploughed on through
the National Park.
B.

Changing Climate Change

From the beginning of the Bush administration, the
international community has been critical of the administration’s
refusal to participate in the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas
emissions or to otherwise agree to binding reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions.56 The international debate took a
decidedly domestic turn in the scientific realm when a front page
article in the June 8, 2005 New York Times reported that a Bush
official, formerly a lobbyist for the American Petroleum Institute
and with no scientific training, had edited an EPA document to
minimize the document’s linkage between greenhouse gases and
global warming.57 Philip A. Cooney, chief of staff for the White
House Council on Environmental Quality, “removed or adjusted
descriptions of climate research that government scientists and
their supervisors, including some senior Bush adminstration
officials, had already approved.”58 The documents were obtained
from the Government Accountability Project, a non-profit
organization which provides legal assistance to government
whistle-blowers.59 The organization was representing a senior
associate in the office that coordinates global warming climate
research, Rick S. Piltz, who resigned from the office in March
2005.60 Although it is not unusual for administration officials to
“vet” government reports, critics said that scientific content
should be reviewed by scientists.61 In a memorandum written by
Mr. Piltz, he stated his objections as follows:
Each administration has a policy position on climate change . . . but I

Id.
Id.
See Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Edited Climate Reports: Ex-Lobbyist Softened
Greenhouse Gas Links, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at A1, A15.
57 Id.
58 Id. at A1.
59 Id. at A15.
60 Id.
61 Id.
One example is the 2003 “Strategic Plan for the United States Climate
Change Science Program,” requested by President Bush in 2001 and reviewed in 2003 by
an expert panel established by the National Academy of Sciences. “The scientists largely
endorsed the administration’s research plan, but they warned that the administration’s
procedures for vetting reports on climate could result in excessive political interference
with science.” Id.
54
55
56
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have not seen a situation like the one that has developed under this
administration during the past four years, in which politicization by
the White House has fed back directly into the science program in
such a way as to undermine the credibility and integrity of the
program.62

Democratic Senators, on June 9 and June 29, 2005, asked
James Mahoney, director of the U.S. Climate Change Science
Program at the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, to retract two reports on climate
change altered by Cooney pending an investigation of whether
Cooney had violated two laws on falsification of information.63
On June 10, 2005, Cooney had resigned his White House position
to take a position with ExxonMobil.64 Any possibility that his
resignation might bring an end to the debate over the altered
reports ended in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, as
congressional representatives debated whether global warming
did or did not have anything to do with changes in the nature of
and severity of storms,65 and studies continued to suggest that
global warming is already causing climate disruption with
present consequences.66
C.

Federal Regulation of Mercury Emissions from Power Plants

Mercury is a neurotoxic pollutant that contaminates the air,
water, and land. When combined with water, mercury becomes
methyl-mercury, a toxin that contaminates fish and makes them
unsafe for consumption.67 In 2004, the EPA and the Federal
Drug Administration (FDA) issued a cautionary warning, advising women of childbearing age and young children to consume no
more than six to twelve ounces of canned tuna per week, due to

62 Id. (internal citation omitted). “For example, a sentence in the October 2002 draft
of ‘Our Changing Planet’ originally read, ‘Many scientific observations indicate that the
Earth is undergoing a period of relatively rapid change.’ In a neat, compact hand, Mr.
Cooney modified the sentence to read, ‘Many scientific observations point to the conclusion that the Earth may be undergoing a period of relatively rapid change.’” Id.
63 Senators Seek Retraction of Science Reports, Probe of Whether White House Acted
Illegally, 36 ENV’T. REP. 1393 (July 8, 2005). The focus was on two laws: 18 U.S.C. §
1505, providing that “any person who ‘corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes’ an
agency’s work that is required by Congress ‘shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both,’” and 18 U.S.C. § 1001, providing that “no person, in this case, in the
executive branch can ‘knowingly and willfully’ make or use ‘any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
entry.’” Id.
64 Id.
65 Domenici Says Regulation a “Daunting Task,” Rejects Linking Global Warming,
Hurricanes, 36 ENV’T. REP. 1947 (Sept. 23, 2005).
66 Effect of Global Warming on Rivers Cited; Reduced Snowpacks Could Cut Water
Supply, 36 ENV’T. REP. 1949 (Sept. 23, 2005).
67 A Hazard to Our Health, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2005, at B8.
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concerns regarding mercury-tainted tuna fish,68 and by the summer of 2005, twenty-one percent of consumers said that they
were “extremely concerned” about the levels of mercury found in
fish.69 Land animals have also been contaminated by mercury,
according to a study in March, 2005 which documented “elevated” mercury levels in the blood of New England wildlife.70
“Mercury pollution from man-made sources, such as power
plants, reduces the IQs of between 300,000 and 600,000 American children each year and will cost the United States an estimated $8.7 billion in lost earnings annually.”71 It also causes illness in humans, with symptoms including heart and lung
disease.72 Power plants have been identified as “the largest single source of mercury emissions in the country, accounting for
more than 90,000 pounds of airborne mercury a year, about a
third of the total output.”73
In 2000, the EPA under the Clinton administration determined that regulation of mercury emissions as a hazardous air
pollutant was required by the Clean Air Act, with “emissions limits based on maximum achievable control technology (MACT), defined by the Clean Air Act as the average of the best-performing
12 percent of sources.”74 This plan, with emissions limits to go
into effect in 2009, would have reduced mercury emissions by
ninety percent.75 In 2001, the Bush administration rescinded the
decision to regulate mercury emissions from power plants as a
hazardous air pollutant in order to create separate, less demanding regulations for mercury emissions.76 In March, 2005, the
EPA released the Clean Air Mercury Rule to set caps on mercury
emissions at approximately 500 power plants having a total of
nearly 1,300 generating units.77 The rule would cap the production of mercury emissions at thirty-eight tons by 2010, and at fifteen tons by 2018, amounting to an overall reduction in mercury

68 Melanie Warner, With Sales Plummeting, Tuna Strikes Back, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2005, at C3.
69 Id.
70 Study Finds ‘Elevated’ Mercury Levels in Songbirds, Other Wildlife in Northeast,
36 ENV’T REP. 465 (Mar. 11, 2005).
71 Mercury Pollution from Industrial Sources Costs $8.7 Billion Annually, Study
Says, 36 ENV’T REP. 416 (Mar. 4, 2005).
72 A Hazard to Our Health, supra note 67, at B8.
73 Michael Janofsky, Some in Senate Seek to Change Mercury Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 2005, at A14 [hereinafter Mercury Rule].
74 EPA Announces First-Ever Regulation to Limit Power Plant Mercury Emissions,
36 ENV’T REP. 525 (Mar. 18, 2005).
75 Mercury Rule, supra note 73.
76 Id.
77 EPA Announces First-Ever Regulation to Limit Power Plant Mercury Emissions,
supra note 74.
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emissions of seventy percent.78 Included in this plan is a cap and
trading system that allows a plant to exceed permissible levels of
mercury emissions if it buys credits from plants whose mercury
emissions fall below regulatory limits.79
The EPA and Bush administration have highlighted that
this program marks the first time that power plant mercury
emissions have been regulated by the federal government,80 although it rescinded a more demanding standard that would have
otherwise been the first such time power plant mercury emissions had been regulated.81 Opponents of the rule contend that
the new EPA rule not only does not do enough to reduce mercury
emissions, but is also illegal under the Clean Air Act as the Act
requires that hazardous pollutants for which certain findings
have been made must be regulated as hazardous air pollutants
under the MACT standard.82 Opponents have also voiced fears
regarding the rule’s cap and trading program, citing concerns
that the program will allow the largest polluters to continue exceeding regulated mercury level limits, because they will be able
to buy their way out of violations.83 Inevitably, opponents of the
Clean Air Mercury Rule sued the EPA to prevent the rule from
taking effect.84 At least one of these suits resulted in the D.C.
Circuit’s denial of a motion to stay implementation of the rule.85
Environmental advocates have been supported in their position
by two national groups of state and local air quality regulators
who share their concerns that the new federal standards are insufficiently protective.86
Id. at 525.
For the Record, WASH. POST, September 18, 2005, at T13; see also EPA Inspector
General Outlines Achievements Over Past Six Months in Report to Congress, 36 ENV’T REP.
1354 (July 1, 2005).
80 EPA Announces First-Ever Regulation to Limit Power Plant Mercury Emissions,
supra note 74; see also Senate Rejects Call on E.P.A. to Toughen Emission Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A16.
81 Mercury Rule, supra note 73.
82 See, e.g., States Ask EPA to Reconsider Mercury Rule Allowing Power Plants to
Avoid Controls, 36 ENV’T REP. 1117 (June 3, 2005); Five Environmental Groups Sue to
Halt Trading Rule for Mercury Emissions, 36 ENV’T REP. 1446 (July 15, 2005); Groups
Seek Stay of Mercury Rule Allowing Coal-Fired Plants to Avoid Emission Controls, 36
ENV’T REP. 1445 (July 15, 2005); Senators Seek Floor Vote on Resolution to Overturn
EPA’s Power Plant Mercury Rule, 36 ENV’T REP. 1502 (July 22, 2005); Michael Janofsky,
Senate Rejects Call on E.P.A. to Toughen Emission Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at
A16; Mercury Rule, supra note 73.
83 Five Environmental Groups Sue to Halt Trading Rule for Mercury Emissions, supra note 82.
84 See, e.g., D.C. Circuit Denies Organizations’ Motion to Stay EPA Rules for Controlling Mercury, 36 ENV’T REP. 1654 (Aug. 12, 2005); Five Environmental Groups Sue to Halt
Trading Rule for Mercury Emissions, supra note 82.
85 D.C. Circuit Denies Organizations’ Motion to Stay EPA Rules for Controlling Mercury, supra note 84.
86 Michael Janofsky, Groups Propose Alternative to E.P.A. Rules on Mercury, N.Y.
78
79
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Various proponents of the rule have hailed it as the best
means of regulating mercury emissions, noting that a similar
program effectively reduced the occurrence of acid rain.87 Representatives of the power plant industry have said that, because
the technology needed to reduce mercury emissions to the original Clean Air Act standards is not yet widely commercially available, this rule represents the best available and most economical
solution.88
On September 13, 2005, the Senate invoked a rarely used
act, the Congressional Review Act, to call for a floor vote in an attempt to repeal the Clean Air Mercury Rule.89 The repeal of the
rule was defeated by a narrow margin, with fifty-one senators
voting to maintain the rule in its current form, and forty-seven
senators voting to repeal the rule and rewrite it.90 Barring any
future amendments, the rule will remain in place and will go into
effect as originally written.
D. What Is Science Anyway?
Since the mid-1960’s, non-scientists, lawyers, judges and
policymakers have struggled to educate themselves about scientific theories and methodologies in order to better assess the legal
basis of environmental decision-making.91 Despite whatever progress has been made in this regard, none of them could have been
fully prepared for the current controversy over what constitutes
“science” and what is instead “religion.” A federal district court
judge in Pennsylvania, however, found himself with the task of
doing exactly that in an adversarial court proceeding in which a
group of Dover, Pennsylvania parents sued the local school board
to block its decision to include intelligent design in the high
school biology curriculum. Judge John E. Jones III first heard of
the case on the radio driving home from the courthouse in December, 2004.92 The next morning, he found that he had been as-

TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at A17.
87 Mercury Rule, supra note 73.
88 See, e.g., Groups Propose Alternative to E.P.A. Rules on Mercury, supra note 86;
Five Environmental Groups Sue to Halt Trading Rule for Mercury Emissions, supra note
82; see also EPA Inspector General Outlines Achievements Over Past Six Months in Report
to Congress, 36 ENV’T REP. 1354 (July 1, 2005); Groups Seek Stay of Mercury Rule Allowing Coal-Fired Plants to Avoid Emission Controls, supra note 82.
89 See Mercury Rule, supra note 73; see also Senate Rejects Call on E.P.A. to Toughen
Emission Rule, supra note 82; Senate Decides to Vote on Rejection of Mercury-Emission
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A18; For the Record. . ., supra note 79.
90 Senate Rejects Call on E.P.A. to Toughen Emission Rule, supra note 82.
91 See generally Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and
What Science Can Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273 (2005).
92 Laurie Goodstein, Evolution Trial in Hands of Willing Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2005, at 41 [hereinafter Evolution Trial].
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signed the case.93
The case was generated by the school board’s decision to require the reading of a four-paragraph statement that evolutionary theory has problems and gaps in its formulation and that intelligent design is an alternative theory worthy of consideration,
referring to an intelligent design textbook.94 It was a carefully
orchestrated conflict. For several years, the Thomas More Law
Center, a non-profit law firm founded by two self-proclaimed conservative Catholics, had looked for a school board willing to require the teaching of intelligent design from that same textbook
in anticipation of a high profile, high stakes trial.95 The Dover
school board agreed to require intelligent design, despite the advice of the board’s attorney that opponents would have a strong
case based on the board’s public record of advocating “putting religion back in the schools.”96 The parents’ attorneys presented
evidence that the board’s purpose was religious.97 In his closing
argument, their attorney accused the board of lying when Board
members testified they had not made religious statements at
board meetings and when they said they did not know fifty copies
of the controversial textbook had been purchased with money
from a church collection through the father of a school board
member.98
For six weeks, the Republican Bush appointee to the bench
presided over a trial in which the central question was whether
the theory that living organisms are so complex that a higher intelligence designed them was an unconstitutional imposition of
religious teaching or constitutionally acceptable education in science.99 A biochemist testified as an expert witness that intelligent design was not the same as creationism, but disagreed with

Id.
Laurie Goodstein, Witness Defends Broad Definition of Science, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 2005, at A15 [hereinafter Witness Defends].
95 Laurie Goodstein, In Intelligent Design Case, A Cause in Search of a Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A16. Thomas Monaghan, a former executive of Domino’s Pizza, is
one of the founders, and former baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn is the chairman. Id.
96 Id.
97 Laurie Goodstein, Closing Arguments Made in Trial on Intelligent Design, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at A10 [hereinafter Closing Arguments].
98 Id.
99 Laurie Goodstein, Issuing Rebuke, Judge Rejects Teaching of Intelligent Design,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Issuing Rebuke]. The statement essentially
said four things: 1) The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require that Darwin’s theory
of evolution be taught; 2) Darwin’s theory is only a theory and filled with many gaps; 3)
Intelligent design is another theory of the origin of life that can be learned about in a book
entitled Of Pandas and People; 4) Students should keep an open mind and the school
leaves discussions of the origins of life up to students and their families. Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 700, 708–09 (M.D. Pa. 2005); Neela Banerjee, An
Alternative to Evolution Splits a Pennsylvania Town , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at 18.
93
94
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some of the many definitions of intelligent design.100 In the end,
the strategy of the intelligent design advocates may have been
poorly selected, as accumulating testimony of religious motivations caused speculation as to not how the case would be decided,
but how broadly it would be written against the defendants.101
On December 20, 2005, the United States Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania handed down its 139-page decision
in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, holding in the first
such case that the intelligent design policy of the Dover School
Board violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.102
Plaintiffs had filed suit challenging “the ID Policy”103 as unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the Constitution
of Pennsylvania. The court applied two tests to determine constitutional validity. The first test was the endorsement test, which
prohibits government from conveying a message that a particular
religion or religious belief is “favored or preferred.”104 The court
looked at four factors to determine whether the ID Policy constituted an endorsement of a religious belief. First, the court examined whether an objective observer would know that the intelligent design and teaching about gaps in evolutionary theory are
in fact strategies to endorse a creationist religious theory of the
origins of life.105 The court found that intelligent design is essentially the creationist theory reworded, and a reasonable observer
would realize that intelligent design uses the exact same arguments about the origins of life as creationism.106 Second, the
court examined whether an objective student would view the disclaimer as to evolutionary theory as an official endorsement of religion.107 The court found that an objective student would find
that the disclaimer wrongly singled out the theory of evolution,
presented an alternative religious message masquerading as science, and directed students either to read the intelligent design
text or seek religious instruction elsewhere.108 The court found
Witness Defends, supra note 94.
Closing Arguments, supra note 97 passim.
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp.2d 700, 709 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20,
2005); Laurie Goodstein, Schools Nationwide Study Impact of Evolution Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at A20.
103 Both the resolution of the Dover School Board and the press release sought to inform students of the gaps in Darwin’s theory and required teachers to read the statement
described above. The resolution and press release together became known as the ID Policy. Kizmiller, 400 F. Supp 2d at 709.
104 Id. at 714.
105 Id. at 714–23.
106 Id. at 22; see also Issuing Rebuke, supra note 99.
107 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 723–29.
108 Id.
100
101
102
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these factors were enough to determine that an objective student
would see the disclaimer as an official endorsement of religion.109
The third factor was whether an objective citizen of Dover would
think the disclaimer was an endorsement of religion.110 Given
the abundance of letters to the local newspapers and the community’s collective perception that the ID policy disclaimer was religious, the court concluded that an objective citizen of Dover
would find the disclaimer was an endorsement of religion.111
Fourth, the court discussed whether intelligent design could be
considered science.112 The court found that intelligent design is
not science because it is based on the non-scientific premise of
supernatural causation and because intelligent design’s attacks
on evolution have been disproved by scientific research.113 Intelligent design has not been accepted by the scientific community,
supported by peer-reviewed research, or supported by research
and testing of its own.114
Once the court determined that the ID Policy was an endorsement of a particular religious view, the court turned to the
Lemon test, which tests whether a government message violates
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.115 The court
examined three factors: 1) whether the message has a secular
purpose; 2) whether the primary effect of the message is to advance religion; and 3) whether the message excessively entangles
government and religion.116 The court determined that the discussions in a series of meetings held by the school board expressed a desire to infuse religion into Dover schools and, in particular, biology classes.117 As to a secular purpose, the Dover
School Board argued that it instituted the ID Policy in order to
improve scientific education; however, very few board members
actually knew what intelligent design was when they voted in favor of the resolution.118 The court found the Board’s stated purpose as an unconvincing pretext for what was actually a religious
message.119 The court also reiterated that because intelligent design is not a science, its only effect is to promote an inherently reId. at 724.
Id. at 729–35.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735–46.
Id. at 735.
Id.; see also Laurie Goodstein, Intelligent Design Might be Meeting its Maker, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at 1, 4.
115 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 746.
116 Id.; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that teaching “scientific creationism” in a public school is a violation of the Establishment Clause).
117 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 748–760.
118 Id. at 758–59.
119 Id. at 763.
109
110
111
112
113
114
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ligious message.120
The court issued a declaratory judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and permanently enjoined the Dover School Board from
pursuing the ID policy.121
Legal arguments aside, Judge Jones rebuked the members of
the school board for a decision of “breathtaking inanity” which
“dragged” the community into “this legal maelstrom with its resulting utter waste of monetary and personal resources.”122 The
voters had already said as much, voting in November to replace
the eight board members supporting intelligent design with a
slate of Democrats who did not and who promised to abide by
whatever the judge decided.123 Unhappy advocates of intelligent
design, including the defendants’ lawyers, having prompted litigation over what constitutes scientific theory, ironically proclaimed that no judge was qualified to determine what was or
was not science.124
Judge Jones’ sweeping decision, however, will not necessarily
put an end to efforts to include intelligent design in some reincarnation from surfacing in school science curricula. The same
day that the Dover board was reconstituted and a week after the
Dover trial hearings concluded, the Kansas School Board of Education adopted new science standards for state-wide science testing for kindergarten through high school that required criticism
of evolutionary theory as a controversial theory and changed the
definition of science so as not to limit it to natural explanations,
without mentioning “intelligent design.”125 Instead, the Kansas
Id. at 764.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 765; see also Issuing Rebuke, supra note 99.
Issuing Rebuke, supra note 99 at A21.
Id.
Jodi Wilgoren, Kansas Board Approves Challenges to Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 2005, at A14; KAN. STATE BD. OF EDUC., KANSAS SCIENCE EDUCATION STANDARDS, Nov.
8, 2005, at vi; see also Dennis Overbye, Philosophers Notwithstanding, Kansas School
Board Redefines Science, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at F3 (emphasis added):
120
121
122
123
124
125
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Evolution and Its Discontents
The Kansas Board of Education adopted new science standards last
week that include required criticism of evolution. Some of the additions are
below, paired with the mainstream understanding of evolutionary biology.
Kenneth Chang
SOME ADDITIONS TO KANSAS
RESPONSE OF MAINSTREAM
SCIENCE STANDARDS
SCIENTISTS
Biological evolution postulates an unguided natural process that has no discernible direction or goal.

The view that living things in all the
major kingdoms are modified descendants of a common ancestor (described
in the pattern of a branching tree) has
been challenged in recently by such
things as: Discrepancies in the molecular evidence (e.g., differences in relatedness inferred from sequence studies of
different proteins) previously thought to
support that view.

Whether microevolution (change within
a species) can be extrapolated to explain
macroevolutionary changes (such as
new complex organs or body plans and
new biochemical systems which appear
irreducibly complex) is controversial.

Some of the scientific criticisms include:
A lack of empirical evidence for a “primordial soup” or a chemically hospitable
pre-biotic atmosphere;
The lack of adequate natural explanations for the genetic code, the sequences
of genetic information necessary to specify life, the biochemical machinery
needed to translate genetic information
into functional biosystems, and the formation of protocells; and
The sudden rather than gradual emergence of organisms near the time that
the Earth first became habitable.

“Unguided” is “a very slippery
word,” said Glenn Branch, deputy director of the National Center for Science Education. Scientific explanations of all natural
processes, from hurricanes to supernovas, are all “unguided.”
The family tree relationships of
some of the early life forms remain unclear. But fossil and biological evidence argues that all
life today descends from the earliest organisms. Not surprisingly,
new methods like comparison of
proteins or genes have generated
family trees that differ somewhat
from those deduced from fossils.
But those differences have not
fundamentally changed scientists’
view of evolution or common descent.
Most biologists do not make the
distinction between microevolution and macroevolution; the larger changes are simply the accumulation of small changes.
Most also say that the issue is
not controversial and that there
is much experimental evidence to
indicate that such changes have
occurred.
The term “irreducibly complex” is
used by Michael Behe, a professor of biology at Lehigh University who is one of the main proponents of intelligent design, but
is not used by other biologists.
The issue of how life originated is
different from that of evolution.
Current ideas on the origin of life
are incomplete and no consensus
has yet emerged. Most scientists
find that this means more research is needed, not that it is
impossible for a theory to
emerge.
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School Board defined science as “a systematic method of continuing investigation that uses observation, hypothesis testing,
measurement, experimentation, logical argument and theory
building to lead to more adequate explanations of natural phenomena.”126 Before the tests were even adopted, the National
Academy of Sciences and National Science Teachers Association
said they would withdraw from the Board permission to use their
copyrighted materials.127
If the core essence of science is testability, how can the supernatural or intuitive be tested and either proven or disproven?
Despite the calls of the lawyers for the Dover defendants for scientists to come forward to prove intelligent design, there has apparently been little academic interest in the pursuit of such research.128 With efforts in two dozen states to introduce such
changes to the curriculum,129 it remains to be seen which will be
a greater deterrent—the broad sweep of a district court decision,
the results of the Dover school board election rejecting intelligent
design board advocates, or the $1 million of plaintiff’s legal fees
the Dover school district must pay.130 As one commentator wryly
noted, in the United States at a time when only forty percent of
Americans believe in evolution, only thirteen percent know what
a molecule is, twenty percent think the sun goes around the
earth, and fifty percent think man lived at the same time as dinosaurs, at best what could be taught in any school is “mediocre
design.”131
III. THE POLITICAL RUNOFF FOR NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION
Nonpoint source pollution is an international problem that
cuts across geographic and political boundaries. The lack of political leadership in the United States to address globally shared
environmental problems was highlighted on February 16, 2005,
when the Kyoto Protocol took effect. The United States Commission on Ocean Policy, after an exhaustive four-year review of
ocean and coastal laws and policy, showed promise of a new direction with its emphasis on the need for an ecosystem-based
management approach, coordinated at the national level with in126 Overbye, supra note 125. The old definition of science reads, “science is the human activity of seeking natural explanations for what we observe in the world around us.”
Id.
127 Jodi Wilgoren, Kansas Fight On Evolution Escalates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at
A11.
128 See Intelligent Design Might Be Meeting Its Maker, supra note 114.
129 Schools Nationwide Study Impact of Evolution Ruling, supra note 102.
130 Id. See also Issuing Rebuke, supra note 99 at A21.
131 Nicholas D. Kristof, The Hubris of the Humanities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2005, at
A27.
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ternational cooperation.132 The recommendations for curbing
nonpoint source pollution, however, were timid and lackluster.
The President’s response to the congressional report was even
more disappointing: appointment of another committee to review
the Ocean Commission’s recommendations.133
Although Admiral Watkins, Chairman of the Ocean Commission, told the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee in April 2004 that climate change related to “every
single topic” in the final U.S. Ocean Commission report,134 there
is no recommendation in the report to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or
to even impose measures to control greenhouse gas emissions.
This glaring omission in the report underscores the political difficulty that the United States is having in effectively addressing a
number of environmental problems, despite being one of the most
affluent and stable countries in the world.
A.

Background

In response to the increasing degradation of water quality in
the nation’s waterways and oceans, in 2000, the United States
Congress mandated the first comprehensive review of ocean policy in over thirty years. The first such review resulted in the
1969 Stratton Commission report, and led to the establishment of
a legal and regulatory framework for ocean policy.135 Since then,
the growing coastal population and ad hoc governmental approach to environmental problems compelled Congress to create
the United States Commission on Ocean Policy (Commission) to
make recommendations for a coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy.136 After several delays,137 it was released in
132 Susan Bruninga, Broad Federal Plan Needed to Address Pollution, Overuse of
Seas, Commission Says, 35 ENV’T. REP. 887 (Apr. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Broad Federal
Plan].
133 See Kenneth R. Weiss, The Nation; Bush Establishes Committee to Set Policy on
Oceans; The Cabinet-level body will deal with priorities including conservation, fishing
and pollution, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at A20.
134 Susan Bruninga, Senators Open to New Federal Policy Idea but Question Funding,
Governance Structure, 35 ENV’T. REP. 948 (Apr. 30, 2004).
135 See Broad Federal Plan, supra note 132. For the original 1969 Stratton Commission report, Our Nation and The Sea, see COMM’N ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND
RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1969),
available at http://www.lib.noaa.gov/edocs/stratton/title.html.
136 See Broad Federal Plan, supra note 132; Oceans Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-256,
114 Stat. 644 (2001), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 833 (2003), Pub. L. No.
107-372, 116 Stat. 3096 (2003), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/
oceanact.pdf.
137 Because the members of the Commission were appointed in July 2001, the original
statutory deadline for the final report was January 2003, and later was amended to June
2003. See § 3(f)(1), 114 Stat. 644, 647 (2001); § 3(f)(1), 116 Stat. 833 (2003); Oceans Act of
2000, 114 Stat. 644, 647 3(f)(1) (2001); 116 Stat. 833 § 203 (2003); S. Rep. No. 108-407, at
2 (2004).
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September 2004.138 The report is a result of multiple regional
public meetings held by the Commission with input from various
federal and state governments, industry, interest groups, the
academic community, the international community, and interested citizens.139 Notably, in November 2001, just as the Commission was beginning its public meetings, it unanimously
passed a one-sentence resolution140 urging the United States to
accede immediately to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea.141
The Commission’s overall recommendation was to move
quickly toward an ecosystem-based management approach to water quality. Achieving this goal required the creation of a National Ocean Council (NOC), composed of all cabinet secretaries
and directors of federal agencies with ocean and coastal responsibilities, to advise the President regarding the national coordination of ocean policies.142 The President must also receive advice from non-federal interest groups such as state governments,
tribes, local agencies, private sector and non-governmental agencies, in the form of a Council of Advisors.143 Naturally, an ecosystem-based approach crosses political and geographical boundaries; thus, with the assistance of the NOC, the creation of
voluntary regional ocean councils to “complement and support”
efforts, not supplant other agency authority, is recommended to
address the unique problems associated with coastal ocean waters and the respective watershed draining into it.144
138 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY (2004), available at http://www.
oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT]; MARJORIE ANN BROWNE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION, CRS
ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND U.S. POLICY, Feb. 10,
2005, at CRS-1.
139 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, REPORT DEVELOPMENT TIMELINE AS OF
SEPTEMBER 27, 2004 (2004), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/calendar/
timelinea9_27_04.pdf; U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, Comments by Regional Meetings,
available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/publicomment/mtgcomments.html (last visited May 3, 2006).
140 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
RESOLUTION (2001), at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/los_resolution.pdf.
141 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_
overview_convention.htm.
142 FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 79.
143 Id. at 81. The Commission noted that its recommendations for establishing the
National Ocean Council and the Presidential Council of Advisors on Ocean Policy are consistent with international trends, specifically the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, which called for better coordination of environmental policy at the national
level. In response, several nations have already established stronger national coordination of ocean and coastal policies. Id. at 79.
144 Id. A watershed is a geographic area where water flows on its way to a larger water body, such as a river, estuary, lake, or ocean. See id. at 154.
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The Commission recommended three stages for calibrating
federal agencies and programs to end the ad hoc approach of the
last thirty years and move toward an ecosystem-based management approach.145 First, the United States National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) must be strengthened to
become the lead federal agency on ocean policy.146 Second, the
half-dozen or so federal, area-based, coastal programs should be
consolidated under NOAA.147 The two main nonpoint source pollution programs under the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization
Amendments (CZARA) and section 319 of the Clean Water Act
(CWA) should be strengthened based on recommendations from
the NOC.148
B.

The Scope of the Problem

The most significant threat to water quality in oceans and
estuaries from land-based sources is the growing development of
coastal areas and the accompanying increase in runoff, airborne
pollutants, and toxic contamination. Nonpoint source pollution is
addressed in a coastal setting primarily in the nonpoint source
provisions of the 1972 CWA as amended and the Coastal Pollution Program149 established by the 1990 CZARA.150 There are
also a number of state, territorial, tribal and local programs that
address the problem. These include legislation surrounding agricultural waste, the proper discharge of pesticides, and toxic
chemicals.
Runoff pollution remains difficult to control because it is a
classic transboundary problem with pollution traveling all the
way from streamheads to coastal waters. There is a growing
need to address the multiple sources of land-based runoff and
airborne pollutants to impose substantive, enforced controls to
reduce their pollution of the marine environment. The federal
emphasis in controlling nonpoint source pollution, and to a lesser
extent in coastal zone management, has been on mandatory procedure and planning at the state level rather than setting or
achieving substantive goals or criteria. Federal regulation of air145 Id. at 109–10. “At last count, more than 55 congressional committees and subcommittees . . . oversee some 20 federal agencies and permanent commissions in implementing at least 140 federal ocean-related statutes.” Id. at 55.
146 See id. at 108–12.
147 Id. at 156.
148 Id. at 218–20. The original recommendation was for the consolidation of these two
NPS pollution programs, but the Commission changed it so that consolidation would be
an option considered by the National Ocean Council. See U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN
POLICY, PRELIMINARY REPORT: GOVERNOR’S DRAFT (2004) at 168, available at http://www.
oceancommission.gov/documents/prelimreport/00_complete_prelim_report.pdf.
149 FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 214.
150 Id.
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borne pollutants has been focused on their impact on air quality
with evolving consideration of their impact on water quality.151
Despite this multitude of programs, overall water quality
appears to be deteriorating. The latest National Water Quality
Inventory concludes that fourteen percent of ocean shoreline
miles are impaired mostly from bacteria and low oxygen and seventy-eight percent of the ninety-two percent of Great Lakes
shoreline assessed are impaired largely from pollutants found in
fish tissue that exceed standards to protect human health.152
Mercury contamination is the leading cause of impairment in
lakes and estuaries, causing forty-nine states to issue 2,618 fish
advisories in 2001.153 States have only assessed nineteen percent
of their rivers and streams, and found that thirty-nine percent
violated water quality standards.154 The states assessed fortythree percent of their lakes and thirty-six percent of their estuaries; of these, forty-five percent of lakes and fifty-one percent of
estuaries did not meet their designated uses.155 The lack of comprehensive monitoring by the states only underscores the difficulties in identifying causes and, in particular, sources of pollution in impaired waters.
In February 2004, the EPA rated the overall national coastal
condition as being between “fair” and “poor.”156 Coastal water
quality and the rate at which pollutants are accumulating in the
tissues of marine organisms was generally considered “fair” overall.157 Coastal habitats however were rated “poor.”158 The overall
score for the benthic index and sediment quality for coastal waters was between “fair” and “poor.”159 The leading stressors on
receiving waters are metals, pesticides, oxygen-depleting substances, toxic chemicals, PCBs, and dissolved solids.160 The primary sources of these pollutants are municipal point sources, urban runoff or storm sewers, atmospheric deposition, industrial
discharges, and agriculture.161
Coastal water quality will only degrade further with increasing development. While coastal counties comprise only seventeen
For a more detailed analysis of these problems, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 138.
EPA, 2000 NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY (2000), available at http://www.
epa.gov/305b/2000report (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 EPA, DRAFT NATIONAL COASTAL CONDITION REPORT II ES-5 (2005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/oceans/nccr/2005/downloads.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See generally DRAFT NATIONAL COASTAL CONDITION REPORT II, supra note 156.
151
152
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percent of total land area, more than half the population of the
United States lives in coastal counties.162 It is expected that the
coastal population will increase from 139 million people in 1998
to 165 million people by the year 2015 (an approximate twenty
percent increase in total coastal population).163
With respect to the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),
the Commission recommended the CZMA program be strengthened “developing strong, specific, measurable goals and performance standards” which reflect an ecosystem-based management
approach.164 Specifically, mechanisms to effectively manage
growth should be included, and geographic boundaries expanded
to include coastal watersheds (not just the coastal ocean waters).165 Federal funding should be considerably increased and
additional incentives provided for states who meet set national
goals.166 Finally, a “fallback mechanism is needed to ensure that
national goals are realized when a state does not adequately participate or perform.”167
Proposed solutions for controlling nonpoint source pollution
generally were far more contentious. The United States has
made tremendous advances in the past twenty-five years to clean
up the aquatic environment by controlling pollution from industrial point sources and sewage treatment plants, but unfortunately less progress has been made in controlling pollution from
diffuse, or nonpoint, sources. In addition to the total maximum
daily load (TMDL) program, during the last ten years a number
of programs are beginning to address nonpoint source pollution.
At the federal level, recent nonpoint source pollution control
measures include the nonpoint source provisions established by
section 319 of the 1987 CWA Amendments,168 and the Coastal
Nonpoint Pollution Program established by the 1990 CZARA.169
Other recent federal programs, as well as numerous state, territorial, tribal and local programs also tackle nonpoint source pollution problems. These programs, however, do not impose in
most instances any mandatory, enforceable requirements on
nonpoint sources and no mandatory controls are imposed at the
162 DANA BEACH, COASTAL SPRAWL: THE EFFECTS OF URBAN DESIGN ON AQUATIC
ECOSYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/
env_pew_oceans_sprawl.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
163 Id. at 1–2.
164 FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 154.
165 Id.
166 Id. The report issued prior to the final report actually recommended federal funding be “considerably increased,” but the final report deleted this language. See U.S.
COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, PRELIMINARY REPORT: GOVERNOR’S DRAFT (2004), at 111.
167 FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 154.
168 Id. at 214.
169 Id.
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federal level by the CWA.
Today, nonpoint source pollution remains the nation’s largest source of water quality problems. It is the main reason that
approximately forty percent of our surveyed rivers, lakes, and estuaries are not clean enough to meet basic uses such as fishing
and swimming.170 The latest National Water Quality Inventory
indicates that agriculture is the leading contributor to water
quality impairments, degrading forty-eight percent of the impaired river miles and forty-one percent of the impaired lake
acreage surveyed by states, territories, and tribes.171 Although
POTWs (point sources) are the leading contributor to water quality impairments in estuaries at thirty-seven percent, runoff from
urban areas is close behind, accounting for thirty-two percent of
water quality impairments to surveyed estuaries (areas near the
coast where seawater mixes with freshwater).172
The most common nonpoint source pollutants are sediments
and nutrients from agricultural lands, animal feeding operations,
construction operations, urban runoff, and other areas of disturbance. Other common nonpoint source pollutants include pesticides, pathogens (bacteria and viruses), toxic chemicals, and
heavy metals. A recent National Academy of Sciences report indicates oil runoff into coastal waters from streets, parking lots,
and industrial sources should be treated on the same threat level
as nutrients, pesticides, and mercury.173 Beach closures, destroyed habitat, unsafe drinking water, fish kills, and many other
severe environmental and human health problems result from
nonpoint source pollutants. The pollutants also ruin the beauty
of healthy, clean water habitats. Each year the United States
spends millions of dollars to restore and protect the areas damaged by nonpoint source pollutants.174
One of the most notorious examples of impairment due to nitrogen runoff is the “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico, where excess nitrogen, primarily from agricultural runoff, causes extensive algal growth off the mouth of the Mississippi river,
triggering a hypoxic zone of 7,000 square miles recurring every
spring and summer.175 The Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia Action Plan,
2000 NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, supra note 152, at ES-3.
Id. at 15, 22.
Id. at 30–31.
See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., COMM. ON OIL IN
THE SEA, OIL IN THE SEA III: INPUTS, FATES, AND EFFECTS passim (2003).
174 Id.
175 Donald A. Goolsby & William A. Battaglin, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY KAN. WATER
SCI. CTR., Nitrogen in the Mississippi Basin—Estimating Sources and Predicting Flux to
the Gulf of Mexico (Dec. 2000), http://ks.water.usgs.gov/Kansas/pubs/fact-sheets/fs.13500.html; see also Nancy N. Rabalais et al., Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico, 30 J. ENVTL.
170
171
172
173
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developed by federal and state officials, concludes that about
eighty-nine percent of the nitrate load to the Gulf is from nonpoint sources.176
1.

Nonpoint
Pollution
Control
Programs
Under
CWA & CZARA
There are two main federal programs aimed at nonpoint
source pollution control: section 319 of the CWA and section 6217
of the CZARA.177 Congress enacted a watershed-based nonpoint
source pollution control program under section 319 of the 1987
CWA Amendments.178 First, states had to prepare an assessment of navigable waters where the control of nonpoint source
pollution was necessary to meet water quality standards, and
identify the significant sources of nonpoint pollution of these waters.179 States also had to identify control measures.180 Second,
states prepared a management program that set out the best
management practices (BMPs) necessary to remedy the problems.181 The EPA had to approve both steps, but could only adopt
a state assessment as opposed to a management report if it disapproved of a state program.182 Significantly, section 319 did not
require that states actually mandate or enforce the BMPs or any
other mandatory controls in their management programs. Although there is extensive literature and experience with BMPs,
there are no minimum BMP guidelines at the federal level comparable to the technology-based effluent limitations set by the
EPA for point sources. Although the EPA could complete nonpoint source assessments for noncomplying states under section
319(a),183 it lacked the authority to develop and implement adequate control plans and measures if a state fails to do so. Moreover, section 319(h)(7) required that section 319 funds not be
used for assistance to persons except for demonstration projects.184 The EPA’s only recourse was to withhold grant funds,
but Congress’s inadequate funding for section 319 grants, and
the negligible consequences to the states for failure to adhere to
section 319, resulted in the failure of section 319 to significantly
QUALITY 320 (2001); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM’N ON GEOSCIENCES, ENVT., AND
RES., CLEAN COASTAL WATERS: UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING THE EFFECTS OF
NUTRIENT POLLUTION (2000).
176 Goolsby & Battaglin, supra note 175, at 4.
177 Clean Water Act § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2000); Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 6201 (1990).
178 Clean Water Act § 319(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(4) (2000).
179 Clean Water Act § 319(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (2000).
180 Clean Water Act § 319(a)(1)(D), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(D) (2000).
181 Clean Water Act § 319(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(A) (2000).
182 Clean Water Act § 319(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(d) (2000).
183 Clean Water Act § 319(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (2000).
184 Clean Water Act § 319(h)(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(7) (2000).
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reduce nonpoint source pollution. In short, under section 319,
the EPA lacked both the regulatory authority and the funding to
impose any effective controls on nonpoint source pollution.
In 1990, Congress updated the CZMA through the CZARA in
an attempt to solve the problems surrounding nonpoint source
pollution programs.185 CZARA section 6217 requires states with
approved coastal zone management programs to develop management programs to curb nonpoint source pollution in coastal
waters that conform to EPA guidelines, including enforceable
BMPs.186 In these programs, the coastal state identifies land
uses that contribute to the degradation of coastal areas, identifies
critical coastal areas, and implements BMPs.187 A major difference between the CWA and CZARA is that under CZARA section
6217, if a state fails to submit or implement its plan, EPA and
NOAA can withhold CWA and CZMA funding.188
The Commission made several recommendations regarding
section 319 of the CWA and section 6217 of the CZARA. First, it
noted that withholding funding only exacerbates nonpoint source
pollution in the failing state, and instead recommended amending the CWA, CZARA, and other federal laws so the EPA and
NOAA would be able to withhold “federal funds for programs
that contribute to degradation of water quality, such as federal
highway construction, . . . [and] agricultural subsidy programs.”189 Withholding funding should only occur when a state
“chronically fails to make meaningful progress toward controlling
nonpoint [source pollution],” considering the possibility that a
state’s failure is due to inland state pollution flowing into the
coastal state.190 In this manner the federal government continues to promote water quality standards. Second, the Commission
found federal funding to the states insufficient to achieve the
goals of CZARA, limiting the Act’s effectiveness.191
The Commission recommended that the NOC should consider options to strengthen CZARA’s section 6217 program and
CWA’s section 319 program, including possible consolidation.192
The Commission also recommended that national nonpoint pollution reduction goals for all impaired coastal watersheds should be
set by the NOC.193
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 214.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id.
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2. TMDL Program
Section 303(d) of the CWA establishes the TMDL process to
provide for more stringent water quality-based controls when
technology-based controls are inadequate to achieve state water
quality standards.194 Although implementing section 303(d) has
proven difficult since its enactment in 1972, the TMDL process
has provided valuable monitoring information of pollution in water bodies, allowing greater public awareness and leading to
technically sound and legally defensible decisions for attaining
and maintaining water quality standards. The controversy
stems from the fact that the TMDL process provides a mechanism for potentially regulating point and nonpoint pollution
sources.
Section 303(d) requires states to ensure that their waters
meet state water quality standards.
A water quality standard consists of four basic elements:
(1) designated uses of the water body (e.g., recreation, water supply, aquatic life, agriculture),
(2) water quality criteria to protect designated uses (numeric pollutant concentrations and narrative requirements),
(3) an antidegradation policy to maintain and protect existing
uses and high quality waters, and
(4) general policies addressing implementation issues (e.g., low
flows, variances, mixing zones).195

A TMDL establishes the maximum allowable loadings of a pollutant, from all sources, for a water body and thereby provides
the basis for states to establish water quality-based controls.
These controls should provide the pollution reduction necessary
for a water body to meet water quality standards, but mechanisms for establishing and enforcing TMDLs have proven ineffective so far.
Not until 1985 did an actual TMDL program exist. The EPA
was busy establishing point source standards and forcing states
to set standards for all state waters that adequately protected existing water qualities and uses.196 In the struggle to achieve
these goals, the EPA sidelined the TMDL program, delaying the
identification of pollutants to be included in the program and try194 See OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND
IMPLEMENTATION 5, 49 (1999).
195 EPA, Water Quality Standards: Basic Information,
http://www.epa.gov/ost/standards/about/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). For general information regarding state water quality standards, see EPA, Water Quality Standards Database, http://www.epa.gov/wqsdatabase (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
196 HOUCK, supra note 194, at 49.
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ing to loosely achieve its goals through a basin planning initiative.197 Although a court order finally forced the EPA to identify
the TMDL pollutants,198 states essentially ignored their obligation to submit TMDLs.199 Following a series of citizen suits in
the 1980s, courts ruled the continued non-submission of TMDLS
by a state eventually becomes the submission of no TMDLs, thus
requiring EPA to step in and promulgate acceptable TMDLs on
the state’s behalf.200 Further litigation made it clear that EPA
approval of inadequate TMDL submissions by states was not acceptable and triggered the necessity for the EPA to either work
with the state to reach a more acceptable solution or to step in
with its own TMDL list.201
In the light of the nationwide TMDL litigation, the EPA began taking a more aggressive approach to revise the program. In
November 1996, the EPA released a draft TMDL Program Implementation Strategy,202 which recognized the importance of
TMDL allocations in the watershed approach, extended the frequency of reporting obligations, combined report categories, and
established many EPA resources for assistance in TMDL development.203 Further review by a diverse committee established
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) achieved
agreement on a number of difficult issues but failed to achieve
Id. at 50.
Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Costle, No. 78-0572, slip op. (D.D.C. June 20, 1978),
cited in Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 42,303 (Sept.
20, 1978).
199 HOUCK, supra note 194, at 51.
200 The rulings established the doctrine of “constructive submission.” Scott v. City of
Hammond, 530 F. Supp. 288, 290 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“Section 303(d)(2) limits EPA’s authority in this area to . . . promulgation after disapproval of such submission. . . . Clearly the
Act provides no basis for a suit against EPA for its ‘failure’ to promulgate TMDLs in the
absence of [a state proposal].”) (emphasis in original), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 741 F.2d
992, 996–97 (7th Cir. 1984) (“We disagree with the conclusion of the district court. We
believe that, if a state fails over a long period of time to submit proposed TMDL’s [sic],
this prolonged failure may amount to the ‘constructive submission’ by that state of no
TMDL’s [sic]. . . . If the EPA disapproves, it then presumably would be under a mandatory duty to issue its own TMDL’s [sic].”); see also Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Reilly, 762
F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (“The court therefore finds that the State of
Alaska has effectively created a ‘constructing submission’ of no TMDLs . . . .”), injunctive
relief granted, 796 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992), aff’d sub nom. Alaska Ctr. for the
Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994).
201 See, e.g., Idaho Sportsmen’s Coal. v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash.
1996); Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v.
Adamkus, 1991 WL 47374 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304 (D.
Minn. 1993); see also Dianne K. Conway, TMDL Litigation: So Now What?, 17 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 83, 95 (1997); Michael M. Wenig, How “Total” Are “Total Maximum Daily Loads”?—
Legal Issues Regarding the Scope of Watershed-Based Pollution Control Under the Clean
Water Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 109 n.103 (1998).
202 EPA, DRAFT TMDL PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY (1996), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/strathp.pdf.
203 Id.
197
198

06) 365-408 MALONE (PAGENUM, HYPH, EN&EM).DOC

394

Chapman Law Review

6/30/2006 12:49:39 PM

[Vol. 9:365

agreement on whether the TMDL process should be used to address nonpoint source pollution.204
At about the same time Congress involved itself in the issue,
the House Transportation Committee’s Subcommittee on Water
Resources and the Environment held hearings on the TMDL program and the proposed regulatory changes.205 As a result of
these hearings, Congress instructed the General Accounting Office (GAO) to address certain issues, primarily “whether states
had sufficient data to develop TMDLs and to estimate the economic impact of the revised regulations.”206 The GAO expressed
substantial concerns on both issues, emphasizing uncertainties
both in the available data and in the EPA’s economic analysis of
the proposed regulations.207
Despite this negative input from Congress, the EPA promulgated its revised TMDL rule in July 2000 and specifically included nonpoint sources of pollution.208 States must schedule the
establishment of TMDLs within 10 years of July 10, 2000, or the
due date on the first list on which the water body appeared, although this schedule may be extended for five years if the original deadline cannot be met despite expeditious action.209 Moreover, this regulation requires that all impaired water bodies,
even those for which TMDLs are not yet required, be placed on a
four-part list and prioritized.210 States are further required to
provide an implementation plan and a “reasonable assurance”
that TMDL wasteloads and load allocations will be met.211
Legal and political challenges resulted from the revised
TMDL regulation, especially the inclusion of nonpoint sources
204 Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for the Clean Water Act’s Ambient
Standards Program, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10415, 10422 (1998).
205 Barclay Rogers & Anne Hazlett, TMDLs: Are They Dead Letters?, AGRIC. L.
UPDATE., Aug. 2001, at 4.
206 Id.
207 In March 2000, the GAO issued its first report highlighting a substantial lack of
data available to determine which water bodies were impaired and to set appropriate
TMDLs. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-54, WATER QUALITY: KEY EPA
AND STATE DECISIONS LIMITED BY INCONSISTENT AND INCOMPLETE DATA (2000). A July
2000 letter from the GAO and its attached second report also questioned the reasonableness of EPA’s economic analysis of the proposed regulations. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REVIEW OF TWO PROPOSED REGULATIONS REGARDING WATER QUALITY
MANAGEMENT (2000), in Letter from Peter F. Guerrero, Director, U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, Envtl. Prot. Issues, to Hon. Bud Shuster, Chairman, Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (June 21, 2000).
208 Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586,
43,588 (July 13, 2000).
209 Id. at 43,591.
210 Id. at 43,590.
211 Id. at 43,591.
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and the revisions to the TMDL schedule.212 The American Farm
Bureau Federation, concerned about the implications of the inclusion of nonpoint sources in the TMDL program, immediately
filed a petition to challenge the new regulation.213 Other special
interest groups have followed suit.214 Interested parties have
also managed to persuade Congress not only to prohibit the EPA
from using any money from fiscal years 2000 or 2001 to fund the
changes,215 but also to require that the EPA hire the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) to analyze the TMDL program and
the new regulation.216 The NAS committee determined that
there is enough scientific information available to begin the
TMDL program because any uncertainty could easily be compensated for in the process of fulfilling the program’s goals, although
it emphasized that uncertainty should not be allowed to form the
basis for unreasonable expectations.217 The committee also made
a number of recommendations that it felt would improve the
TMDL program and expedite the achievement of its goals, such
as designating appropriate uses before development of the TMDL
list, more periodic assessments of TMDL plans, and inclusion of
more pollutants affecting water quality.218 It stated, somewhat
wryly, that success should be strictly predicated upon whether a
water body can support its designated use so as to ensure that
states do not lose sight of the ultimate goal.219
In response to these reactions, the EPA postponed the effective date of the final TMDL regulation for 18 months, from October 1, 2001, to March 1, 2003.220 The deadline for the submission
of states’ lists of impaired waters was extended from April 1,
2002, to October 1, 2002, with the extension to permit reconsideration of certain aspects of the revisions in light of the reactions
to the revised rule and the NAS report.221 In 2002, the EPA anRogers & Hazlett, supra note 205, at 5.
Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Browner, No. 00-1320 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
See Susan Bruninga, Nine Petitions Filed in Major Fight Over Final Rule Revising
TMDL Program, 31 ENV’T REP. 2618 (Dec. 15, 2000).
215 Military Construction Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-246, 114 Stat. 511, 567
(2000).
216 Department of Veteran Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Act, Pub. L. No. 106-377, 114 Stat. 1441, 1441A-3 (2000).
217 COMM. TO ASSESS THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD
APPROACH TO WATER POLLUTION REDUCTION, ET AL., ASSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH TO
WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT 4 (2001).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 3.
220 See Delay of Effective Date of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management
Regulations; and Revision of the Date for State Submission of the 2002 List of Impaired
Waters, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,817 (Aug. 9, 2001).
221 See id. at 41,818. Farm groups and industry generally supported the postpone212
213
214
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nounced development of a “water pollutant trading system” (generally for phosphorous and nitrogen nutrients) to be incorporated
into the TMDL program, but it has proven more difficult than air
pollutant trading because water pollutant trading must occur
within the same water body for the same pollutant.222 While the
pollutant trading policy is a voluntary, incentive-based approach,
the EPA remains hopeful that it will, through proper alignment
with the CWA and implementing regulations, enable greater efficiency in the protection and restoration of impaired water bodies.223 The Commission encouraged use of such incentive-based
approaches.224
Thirty years in the making, an adequate and effective TMDL
program has never seemed farther from implementation. Consent decrees resulting from forty legal challenges in thirty-eight
states have ordered states to finish preparing TMDLs in anywhere from one to twenty years.225 The TMDLs that have been
provided to the EPA tend to avoid controlling nonpoint source
pollution, do not calculate their share of the allocation load, or
both. States in some cases also failed to submit inventories of
ment, with farm groups still objecting to the regulation of nonpoint source pollution as a
federal presumption of local land use policy, whereas environmental groups did not support the delay. See Susan Bruninga, Environmental Advocates Oppose Delay in TMDL
Rule; Industry, Ag Groups Supportive, 32 ENV’T REP. 1829 (Sept. 21, 2001). The Federal
Water Quality Coalition filed one of about a dozen petitions for review of the July 2000
rule. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Browner, No. 00-1320, (D.C. Cir. 2000). The EPA subsequently circulated a draft report on the total estimated costs of the TMDL program, which
reported that the costs to industry to implement the TMDL program could range from
under $1 billion to $4.3 billion annually. EPA, EPA 841-D-01-003, THE NATIONAL COSTS
OF THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD PROGRAM (Draft Report 2001), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/coststudy/coststudy.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
222 33 ENV’T REP. S-19 (Jan. 25, 2002). But see Sonya Dewan, Note, Emissions Trading: A Cost-Effective Approach to Reducing Nonpoint Source Pollution, 15 FORDHAM
ENVT’L L. J. 233 (2004). On May 15, 2002, EPA proposed the water quality trading policy
for comment. Water Quality Trading Policy; Proposed Policy, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,709 (May
15, 2002). Various federal agencies, including the EPA, the U.S. Department of the Interior, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Department of Commerce have
agreed upon a final comprehensive science-based approach to watershed delineation and
assessment on federal lands. See Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to
Federal Land and Resource Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 62,566 (Oct. 18, 2000). Factors
affecting wetlands will be considered when determining the best management practices
and priorities for both land and water uses. The agencies’ watershed goals will involve
minimizing adverse water quality impacts from management programs, minimizing the
impairment of current and future uses, and restoring watersheds that do not reach water
quality standards. Id.
223 For the proposed rule, see Water Quality Trading Policy; Proposed Policy, 67 Fed.
Reg. 34,709 (May 15, 2002). The EPA issued its final notice on January 13, 2003. Water
Quality Trading Policy; Issuance of Final Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608 (Jan. 13, 2003). A water pollutant trading system has been in place since the 1990s for primarily POTWs (i.e.,
point source to point source), but also in the Great Lakes and Long Island Sound areas.
224 FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 210.
225 After Years of Slow Progress, TMDL Program Picks Up Speed as Result of Consent
Decrees, 33 ENV’T REP. 2423 (Nov. 18, 2002).
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impaired waters, rank them, promulgate TMDLs, and incorporate them into controls.226 On March 19, 2003, the EPA formally
withdrew the July 2000 Total Maximum Daily Load rule.227 Until a revised TMDL program is put into effect, the current TMDL
program, promulgated in 1985 and amended last in 1992, remains in effect.228
The issue of the EPA’s authority to regulate nonpoint source
pollution through TMDLs and section 303(d) was litigated in
court. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the EPA’s authority
to establish TMDLs even for water bodies impaired solely by
nonpoint source pollution.229 A California state agency issued a
permit for timber harvesting to plaintiff-landowners with serious
restrictions designed to reduce soil erosion into a nearby river.
The EPA stated the river was in violation of state water quality
standards and imposed TMDLs when the state missed the deadline to establish its own TMDLs. Plaintiffs argued the permit restrictions were due to EPA’s TMDL standard because the state
feared losing federal funding, and brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act challenging the EPA’s interpretation that
the CWA allowed the EPA to establish TMDLs on rivers polluted
solely by nonpoint source pollution.230
The Ninth Circuit noted that section 303 requires states to
create EPA-approved water quality standards or to have the EPA
impose standards upon them and did not draw any distinction
among navigable waters or their pollutants.231 Furthermore, the
mandatory planning process of section 303 required the EPA to
address nonpoint as well as point sources in approving or deter226 Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths that Threaten the TMDL Program, 32
ENVTL. L. REP. 11133, 11135 (2002).
227 Withdrawal of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in
Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 68 Fed.
Reg. 13,608 (Mar. 19, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122–24, 130); see also Press
Release, EPA, Final Withdrawal of 2000 TMDL Rule Takes Effect; Existing Rules Make
Progress Cleaning Up Impaired Waters (Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://yosemite1.epa.
gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/601385d1f25da12485256ce800824d38?OpenDocument (last visited June 26, 2006).
228 Withdrawal of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in
Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, supra
note 227.
229 Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926
(2003); Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1356 (N.D. Cal. 2000); David K.
Bowles, EPA May Impose TMDLs for Substandard Rivers Impaired Solely by Nonpoint
Sources, ABA SPECIAL COMM’N ON AGRIC. MGMT. NEWSL. 15 (June 2000); Susan Bruninga, Court Rules TMDL Program Can Apply to River Polluted by Nonpoint Sources, 31
ENV’T REP. 639 (Apr. 7, 2000).
230 Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d. at 1338–39.
231 Nastri, 291 F.3d at 1127.
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mining TMDLs, in order to ensure the adequate implementation
of water quality standards for all navigable waters.232 The court
deferred to the EPA’s interpretation of the 1985 regulations
without relying on the provisions of the delayed final rule.233
Every environmental initiative of the past thirty years has
had to grapple with scientific uncertainty, allocation of enforcement authority, inconsistencies in monitoring, and variances in
state and federal approaches. The ultimate goal of the 1972
CWA remains the achievement of fishable and swimmable waters, yet there are no mandatory controls imposed at the federal
level on nonpoint source pollution or sanctions for states who fail
to meet their own water quality standards. Critics contend that
nonpoint source pollution is not more varied, site-specific, or
more technologically difficult to control than point source pollution.234
The controversy over the TMDL program has to be viewed
against the backdrop of the problem of nonpoint source pollution,
particularly from large-scale agriculture, and the history at the
federal level of funding state and local programs which ordinarily
do not impose mandatory requirements. As the GAO report concluded, many of the states’ criticisms of the TMDL program stem
not from scientific uncertainty but from the lack of states’ consistency in defining designated uses and various data utilized to
evaluate impairment.235 EPA guidelines can partially remedy
the lack of consensus among states, but some states have vehemently objected to the possibility of EPA requiring TMDLs with
respect to a water body not within the states’ designated use.
Section 303(d) is regrettably silent on precisely how and when
TMDL implementation should occur. The rather scant 1972 legislative history of state support of water quality standards is sufficient to demonstrate that the states feared the prospect of “federal land use” and fought to retain control by maintaining
supervision of nonpoint source pollution.236 Land use is, howId. at 1132.
Id. at 1131 n.8.
HOUCK, supra note 194, at 87. For an ambitious article demonstrating how the
TMDL program could remedy nonpoint source pollution, see Paula J. Lebowitz, Land Use,
Land Abuse, and Land Re-Use: A Framework for the Implementation of TMDL’s for Nonpoint Source Polluted Water Bodies, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 97 (2001); see also Oliver A.
Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V: Aftershock and Prelude, 32 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10385 (Apr. 2002).
235 See supra note 207.
236 See generally Senate Public Works Subcommittee Hearings on Water Pollution
Control Legislation (1971) (testimony of EPA); Senate Public Works Subcommittee Hearings on Water Pollution Control Legslation (1971) (testimony of CEQ, Army and EPA);
House Public Works Committee Hearings on Water Pollution Control Legislation (1971)
(testimony of EPA, Treasury, CEQ, HEW, HUD, FmHA and Coast Guard); House Public
Works Committee Hearings on Water Pollution Control Legislation (1971) (testimony of
232
233
234
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ever, determined at the federal level, in a number of ways
through a variety of federal programs, most notably the CZMA.237
Imposing some degree of mandatory controls, by assessing nonpoint sources’ share of the load allocation and requiring some
minimal level of control on those sources only for impaired waters, is one reasonable, moderate option in water quality improvement.
The focus now is clearly on regulation of nonpoint source pollution, but significantly the Commission failed to recommend further enforcement of the TMDL program. The Commission concluded “improv[ing] coastal water quality will require significant
reductions in nonpoint sources” of pollution,238 the “majority” of
which comes from agricultural and stormwater runoff.239 EPA
has issued guidelines from a “watershed perspective” for managing agricultural nonpoint source pollution.240 The voluntary
guidelines cover all phases of runoff management from planning
and development to program evaluation, and include both structural and nonstructural management practices that local and
state agencies, landowners, developers, conservation groups, and
other interested parties can use. Nonstructural practices include
urban planning and zoning, minimizing paved surfaces, pollution
reduction and recycling technique and preservation of wetlands
and other natural drainage systems. Guidance on structural
practices pertains to storm water and wastewater treatment systems and run off controls, such as silt fencing, retention ponds,
and creased vegetation. The Commission recommendations echo
the efforts of EPA, but fail to mention the TMDL program in its
proposals. However, the Commission did call for the NOC to establish national nonpoint pollution reduction “goals” for all impaired waters.241
C.

The Politics of Reform

There is wide agreement that the last thirty years of environmental regulation have been successful in implementing
technology-based controls on point source pollution, but the need
now is for enforceable water quality standards regulating both
point and nonpoint source pollution. The lack of enforcement
CEQ, CEA and EPA).
237 See generally LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE
(2002).
238 FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 212.
239 Id. at 215.
240 See Nonpoint Source Program and Grants Guidelines for States and Territories,
68 Fed. Reg. 60,653 (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps (last visited
Apr. 9, 2006).
241 FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 79–80.
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mechanisms and water quality monitoring information, as well
as a lack of political will and federal funding, has hampered efforts. A recent report by the Pew Ocean Commission presaged
many of the Commission’s findings as to the need for stronger
controls. Specific to nonpoint source pollution, the Pew Ocean
Commission recommended effective implementation of the TMDL
program: “States should determine the total maximum daily
load (TMDL) of pollutants that a water body can accept and still
attain water quality standards. The states should then implement meaningful plans for achieving the point and nonpoint
source pollution reductions indicated by TMDLs.”242
Congress established the Ocean Commission because of major changes since the 1969 Stratton Commission Report: the
large migration of people to coastal areas; the increase of federal
and state regulations which often duplicated efforts and produced confusing and sometimes contradictory results; the increased use of the marine environment leading to depletion of resources and degradation of habitats; the increased complexity of
environmental threats; and the potential for economic and scientific opportunities using modern technology.243 Congress mandated the Commission to review these issues and specify policy
recommendations.244
After two initial public meetings in September and November of 2001, where congressional members and various administrators testified, the Commission unanimously passed a resolution245 urging the United States to immediately accede to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.246 The Commission then held nine regional meetings across the country from
January through September 2002, hearing testimony from various federal and state governments, industry representatives, interest groups, the academic community, the international community, and interested citizens.247 On September 24, 2002, the
Commission released its Mid-Term Report, summarizing the in242 PEW OCEANS COMM’N, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA
CHANGE 57–58 (2004), available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/env_pew_oceans_final_
report.pdf.
243 S. REP. NO. 106-301, at 2–5 (2000) (Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/commission/Senate_Report.pdf.
244 Id. at 5.
245 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY RESOLUTION, UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION RESOLUTION (2001), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/
los_resolution.pdf.
246 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.
247 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, REPORT DEVELOPMENT TIMELINE AS OF APRIL 5,
2004 (2004), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/calendar/timeline4_5_04.pdf.
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formation gathered.248 Four public deliberation meetings were
held in Washington, D.C., from October 2002 to April 2003 to further discuss possible policy recommendations.249 It was also during this time that the date to submit the Commission’s final report to Congress and the President was extended from the spring
of 2003250 to June 2003251 to early fall of 2003.252 Over the course
of the Commission’s fifteen public meetings, 440 individuals testified, including ocean scientists and researchers, environmental
organizations, industry officials, citizens, and government officials.253 The Commission also received nearly 200 public comments from a similar cross-section of interests.254 In June 2003,
the Commission released a draft Table of Contents for the forthcoming final report.255 During the second half of 2003 and beginning of 2004, the Commission drafted its report, releasing the
Preliminary Report in April 2004 for public comment,256 particularly from governors of coastal states, whose comments must be
included in the final report to Congress and the President.257 As
a result, the public comment period deadline was extended from
May 21, 2004 to June 4, 2004.258
Although the Commission’s delayed, final findings on the
need to control nonpoint source pollution are very forceful, the
recommendations are much less so. The recommendations
merely direct the yet to be established NOC to set a national goal
of reducing nonpoint pollution in impaired coastal watersheds,
248 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY: MIDTERM REPORT (2002), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/
midterm_report/ReportCovREV10_01_02.pdf.
249 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 247.
250 Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Ocean Policy, Final Report to Congress and President Due in Spring 2003 (Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/
newsnotices/jan10_chasmtg.html.
251 See U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 247, at 1.
252 Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Ocean Policy, U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
Sets Framework for New National Ocean Policy: Table of Contents Document Outlines
Major Areas of Interest (June 2, 2003), http://oceancommission.gov/newsnotices/
jun2_03.html.
253 Id.
254 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, PUBLIC COMMENT ARCHIVE (public comments received through March 2004), available at http://oceancommission.gov/publicomment/
welcome.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
255 U.S COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, WORKING TABLE OF CONTENTS—DRAFT FINAL
REPORT (2003), available at http://oceancommission.gov/documents/working_toc6_26_03.pdf.
256 Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Ocean Policy, U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy To
Release Preliminary Report April 20—Historic Report to be Reviewed By Governors and
Stakeholders (Mar. 10, 2004), http://oceancommission.gov/newsnotices/mar10_04.html.
257 Oceans Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-256, § 3(g)(2), 114 Stat. 644, 648 (2001),
amended by Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 833 (2003), Pub. L. No. 107-372, 116 Stat.
3096 (2003).
258 Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Ocean Policy, U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
Extends Comment Deadline to June 4, 2004 (May 14, 2004), http://oceancommission.gov/
newsnotices/may14_04.html.
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and to set specific, measurable objectives to meet water quality
standards.259 Its only directive to Congress is Recommendation
14-10, which states that Congress should authorize “federal
agencies to establish enforceable management measures for nonpoint sources of pollution and impose financial disincentives related to programs that result in water quality degradation if a
state persistently fails to make meaningful progress toward
meeting water quality standards on its own.”260 Significantly,
this recommendation does not direct Congress or the EPA to set
mandatory management measures, but only to authorize federal
action if a state does not “make meaningful progress” toward
meeting water quality standards.261 This standard for federal intervention is essentially meaningless, given the vagueness of
“meaningful progress” and that it need only be “progress” toward
meeting general water quality standards rather than any required best management practices.262
What then does the Report say as to setting some actual
management measures for nonpoint pollution and who is to set
them? On both levels, the Report’s recommendation is phrased
in such a way as to ensure ineffectiveness. Recommendation 1411 directs states and local governments to revise their codes and
ordinances “to require land use planning and decision making to
carefully consider” the impacts of development on water quality.263 In other words, after finding that nonpoint pollution from
land-based activities is the most serious threat to coastal and
ocean water quality, what does the Report recommend? That a
yet-to-be established Council with no enforcement authority set
objectives for meeting state water quality standards, whatever
they might be, and that state and local governments make sure
they “consider” the impacts of development on water quality,
consideration they are already required to give under the Clean
Water Act.264 What if development continues to be authorized
despite clearly detrimental impacts on water quality? Unlike the
Pew Report, the preliminary Ocean Commission Report only calls
for federal intervention if a state is not making “meaningful progress” toward meeting water quality standards, an ambiguous
term which could allow for decades of unrestrained water quality
impairment before federal intervention would be necessary.265
This discrepancy between the forcefulness of the findings
259
260
261
262
263
264
265

FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 218.
Id. at 220.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 221.
See id.
See id. at 220.
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and the tentativeness of the recommendations did not go unnoticed in the initial reactions of U.S. Senators from two Senate
Committees, the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee, when presented with the preliminary Report.266 Senator Fritz Hollings of
South Carolina was the most outspoken in this regard.267 He
questioned the efficacy of an ocean council as opposed to a department that would have more direct access to the President.268
He told James Watkins, who presented the Report, that he
agreed with just about everything in the report, but added,
“[y]ou’re passionate in your answers but tentative and almost a
sissy in your recommendations.”269 Watkins agreed with Senator
Hollings that the goals would not be met without a strong commitment to them by the President.270
Watkins also told the Senate Commerce Committee that climate change relates to “every single topic in the report” and that
the “climate change issue alone is powerful enough to drive the
recommendations all by itself.”271 The recommendations for international policy, however, say nothing about the U.S.’s failure
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or any other measures to control
greenhouse gases. Chapter 29, “Advancing International Ocean
Science and Policy,” contains a chart which indicates that the
United States has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the Protocol to
the London Convention, Annexes IV (sewage) or VI (air emissions) to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the
Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals, or the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.272 Yet the only recommendation
with respect to any of these treaties is Recommendation 29-2,
which states that “The National Ocean Council should coordinate
an expedited review and analysis of the ocean-related components of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
and recommend to the U.S. Department of State whether, from
an ocean perspective, ratification of this treaty would be beneficial to U.S. interests.”273 With respect to international efforts to
control nonpoint source pollution, favorable mention is made of
the U.S.’s involvement in UNEP’s fourteen regional seas pro266 See Susan Bruninga, Senators Open to New Federal Policy Idea But Question
Funding, Governance Structure, 35 ENV’T REP. 948–49 (Apr. 30, 2004).
267 See id. at 948.
268 See id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 949.
272 FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 446–48.
273 Id. at 448.
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grams as part of the 1995 Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Sources
(GPA)274 and UNEP’s 2002 Hilltop to Oceans Initiative,275 and
the June 3, 2003 G-8 statement declaring their intention to implement a global action plan for sustainable ocean development.276 The only recommendation, however, which relates to
these deficiencies and potential corrective actions is Recommendation 29-8: “The United States should increase its efforts to enhance long-term ocean science and management capacity in other
nations through funding, education and training, technical assistance, and sharing best practices, management techniques, and
lessons learned.”277
The prospects for meaningful implementation of even the
relatively timid recommendations of the Ocean Commission are
bleak. Generally, the Report lays the most important burdens of
implementation on the yet to be created Ocean Council for improvement at the federal level, and on the reluctant and financially strapped state and local governments for the remainder.
With respect to control of nonpoint source pollution specifically,
states and local governments are given a vague, unenforceable
recommendation to make progress toward undefined goals, instead of recommending that Congress require compliance with
TMDLs or mandate use of BMPs with sanctions (or withdrawal
of funding) for failure to comply, or recommending withdrawal of
federal subsidies that directly encourage coastal development.
As of mid-2004, only one-fifth of concentrated animal feedlots
(CAFOs) were in compliance with the 2003 requirements, yet the
Report says nothing about how to ensure that CAFOs comply
with the regulatory limitations.278
The very creation of the Ocean Council has already prompted
divergent criticism. In a public hearing on the preliminary Report on July 28, 2004, the last hearing before issuance of the Final Report, one of the most contentious issues was this creation
of another level of bureaucracy, with some environmental NGOs,
like Senator Hollings in the hearings, saying that the Council
was too weak an instrument for change at the federal level, and
state representatives insisting on more state influence and that
regional ocean councils be established. What timid control
measures that were recommended by the Report to control nonpoint pollution were questioned by the very state representatives
274
275
276
277
278

Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 455.
See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 138.
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charged with their oversight and implementation. Most states
opposed the establishment of any form of disincentive or penalty
as a mechanism for ensuring implementation of and compliance
with federal program requirements. As a public summary of the
state comments noted:
Most recognize nonpoint source pollution as a major problem facing
the nation; however, there is not a consensus regarding the recommendation to merge the Coastal Zone Management Act Section 6217
program into the Clean Water Act Section 319 nonpoint program. In
addition, most strongly disagree with the use of disincentives or penalties to facilitate the implementation of nonpoint programs.279

This longstanding unwillingness on the part of states to require and enforce BMPs in land use is precisely why the most serious deficiency of the Report in this regard is its failure to mandate imposition of such requirements at the federal level.280
At the international level, even the state representatives indicated that too little attention was given in the Report to climate change and its effect on coastal resources and communities.
No mention is made of the U.S.’s failure to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol other than its inclusion in a chart. The Report’s recommendations that the U. S. ratify the Law of the Sea Convention
and Annex VI merely reflect ongoing processes already headed in
that direction. The clear need for the U.S. to ratify the Biodiversity Convention to preserve marine resources results only in another directive to the Ocean Council to review the need for its
ratification.
At the Senate hearings, James Watkins agreed with Senator
Hollings that what was most necessary to national and international ocean policy was a commitment by the President to see
that reform is effectuated.281 The President was given ninety
days to respond to the Final Ocean Report, which expired on December 20, 2004.282 Instead of recommending action, on December 17, 2004, the President appointed yet another committee to
review the recommendations of the U.S. Ocean Commission.283
On the forefront of issues to be addressed was expanding the use
of fishing quotas and seeking ratification of the United Nations
279 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, SUMMARY OF GOVERNOR AND TRIBAL LEADER
COMMENTS ON THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY’S PRELIMINARY REPORT (July 22,
2004), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/newsnotices/summary_govcomments.pdf.
280 See generally MALONE, supra note 237.
281 See Testimony of Adm. James Watkins, USN (Ret.) before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Sept. 21, 2004, http://commerce.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1316&wit_id=3292.
282 See Oceans Act of 2000 § 3(i), Pub. L. No. 106-256 (2000).
283 Exec. Order No. 13366, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,591 (Dec. 17, 2004), available at http://
edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-28079.pdf.
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Convention on the Law of the Sea. Conspicuously absent from
the plan was any evaluation or decisions for control of nonpoint
source pollution.
D. Conclusion
The environmental naiveté of the 1970’s when civil society
expected that all waters in the United States would be fishable
and swimmable by 1985—is long past. As a society we have recognized that environmental problems are complex and challenging whether we have perfect information, imperfect information,
or no information at all. When legislating or regulating to address these problems, there are essentially two steps. First, there
must be an assessment of the environmental problem and of
what is necessary to remedy it. However difficult this first determination might be, the next determination is even more so:
what is the balance to be struck between the environmental values to be served by the proposed remedy, and all the other conflicting social values which will be compromised by the remedy?
The second step is a policy matter, but the first, fundamental
step is essentially a scientific determination. The second determination will be flawed at its core if the first assessment is not
done with the best available, reliable, unfettered scientific information which can be obtained.
Nowhere is this need for unpoliticized, scientifically verified
information more apparent than with nonpoint source pollution.
For over thirty-five years, reduction of nonpoint source pollution
has been unachievable. Is it the fault of politics, or the failure of
current controls to achieve the anticipated reductions, or the
infeasibility of controls on such pollution? Science should be able
to tell us if it is the second or third of these reasons. If it is not
either, then the answer is politics, and the question is starkly
posed. As a society are we willing to do what it takes to reduce
nonpoint source pollution, or are we willing to accept lesser water
quality as the trade-off for not imposing the necessary measures?
That question is a nationally significant discourse that needs
to take place at every level of government and society. To date, it
has not because opponents of nonpoint source pollution controls
for economic reasons couch their arguments in political reasons,
in the guise of infeasibility or ineffectiveness of control methods.
Perhaps they are right, but we do not know. We cannot know because the science we need so badly to tell us what can be done
and how is simply not available, and the prospects for it becoming available are not bright.
As this article was being finalized, the highest ranking cli-
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mate scientist at NASA charged the Bush administration with
trying to stop him from calling for prompt reductions in greenhouse gases to curb global warming.284 A week later, NASA’s
administrator issued a strongly worded statement to the agency’s
employees asserting that “[i]t is not the job of public-affairs officers to alter, filter or adjust engineering or scientific material
produced by NASA’s technical staff.”285
On February 3, 2006, the chair of the U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy and the chair of the PEW Oceans Commissions
joined forces to criticize the Bush administration and Congress
for inadequate funding and action on the recommendations made
by the presidential panel which formulated the U.S. Ocean Action Plan to implement the Commissions’ recommendations a
year ago.286 The joint commission’s “report card” on implementation gave a “D-plus” for ocean policy reform, and an “F” for failure
to ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.287 Any suggestion of favoritism to certain outcomes in scientific research in
the executive branch is more of a threat to the legitimacy of science when funding for scientific research is dwindling as it has
been. When funding is scarce, and politically driven outcomes
preferred, the danger of junk science being not only overly recognized but overly funded is increased as scientists compete for
scarce governmental grants or turn to private grants from organizations with purely political agendas. Coupled with the current administration’s acceptance of the all-powerful, unitary executive theory of governance, the chilling effect is magnified on
scientific study which does not serve the political purposes of the
administration.
Whatever reforms may be necessary for the validation of scientific studies, science is valuable and respected precisely because it answers the questions of “how” with a modicum of political objectivity, before we must ask ourselves the political
question of “whether or not.” Respect and support for science in
environmental determinations is not a new form of naiveté—
284 Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Expert Says NASA Tried to Silence Him, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2006, at A1.
285 Andrew C. Revkin, NASA Chief Backs Agency Openness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006,
at A1. On January 27, 2006, the Center for Health and the Global Environment of Harvard University sponsored a briefing for Congress on “how science works.” As Republican
Sherwood Boehlert, head of the House Science Committee, remarked, “everyone boasts
that they are for science-based policy until the scientific consensus leads to an unwelcome
conclusion, and then they plan to go to Plan B.” Cornelia Dean, Where Science and Public
Policy Intersect, Researchers Offer a Short Lesson on Basics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at
F3.
286 Amena H. Sard & Patricia Ware, White House, Congress Get Mixed Marks for
Ocean Policy from Joint Commission, 37 ENV’T REP. 303 (Feb. 10, 2006).
287 Id.
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scientists are subject to the same pressures to achieve and produce as any professional. The difference is that their field is defined by its very objectivity and susceptibility to methods of objective verification which do not depend on leaps of faith, or predesired, politically motivated outcomes. Is it possible to reduce
nonpoint source pollution with land use controls? If so, which
controls would provide the most reduction for the least economic
cost? If those two questions were posed to a scientist, a lawyer,
an entrepreneur, an environmental advocate, and a politician,
whose opinion would you trust to be the most honest, objective
assessment?
Our society and others desperately need the answers to these
two questions, and we need them answered with science. Delegitimization of science undermines not only science, but the legitimacy of the administrative, legal and policy processes as well.

